The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible
solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
I
It is a platitude that whereas words are connected to what they represent merely by arbitrary conventions, depictions are connected to what they represent by resemblance.
The important difference between my portrait and my name, for example, is that whereas my portrait is connected to me by my portrait's resemblance to me, my name is connected to me merely by an arbitrary convention. The objective of this paper is to reconcile the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance with the intentionality of depiction or, in other words, with the problematic possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation.
The problem of the depiction of non-existents can be appreciated by considering the following trilemma, which consists of three theses which are individually plausible, but jointly inconsistent: The first two theses imply that depictions only represent existents, but this is incompatible with the third thesis, that some depictions represent non-existents. So there is a prima facie inconsistency between the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance and the possibility of the depiction of non-existents.
The first thesis, that all depictions resemble what they represent, is plausible because it is suggested by the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. Since the Mona Lisa's representation of Lisa, for example, is mediated by resemblance, it seems to follow that the Mona Lisa must resemble Lisa. Similarly, if Holmes' portrait's representation of Holmes is mediated by resemblance, it seems to follow that Holmes' portrait must resemble Holmes. (Note that non-figurative paintings, which may seem like obvious counterexamples to the first thesis, are not classified as depictions because they are intuitively not the same kind of representation as figurative pictures.)
The second thesis, that resemblance is a relation between existents, is plausible because it follows from the analysis of resemblance as a relation which obtains between two things if and only if they share properties. Peas in a pod, for example, resemble each other because they share the properties of greenness, roundness and yuckiness. Since non-existents do not have properties, it follows that resemblance is a relation between existents. Peas, for example, cannot be green without existing, so only existent peas can resemble each other in respect of greenness. Similarly, since
Santa cannot be red without existing, Santa's portrait cannot resemble Santa in respect of being red unless Santa exists.
The third thesis, that some depictions represent non-existents, is supported by intuitive examples. The most obvious example is depiction of fiction: Holmes does not exist, but The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes contains illustrations which depict Holmes. But examples are not confined to depiction of fiction: it is also possible to depict things which are thought to exist, but in fact do not. For example, Vulcan, the planet hypothesized to be the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Mercury, does not exist, but there are depictions of Vulcan. Those depictions that were produced when Vulcan was really thought to exist are no more fiction than depictions of the other 3 nine planets, since the mere discovery that a depiction is not veridical is not sufficient to make it fictional.
Two other problems arise from the intentionality of depiction. The first is the problem of depicting non-particulars. It arises from the fact that it seems possible to depict something without depicting something in particular, but impossible to resemble something without resembling something in particular. A picture may depict a horse, for example, without depicting Phar Lap, Bucephalus, Incitatus or any other particular horse. But a picture cannot resemble a horse without resembling a particular horse, since a picture cannot share a property with horses in general, but only with particular horses such as Phar Lap, Bucephalus and Incitatus. Correctly resolving the trilemma concerning the depiction of non-existents should resolve this problem too.
The second is the problem of depictive misrepresentation. Suppose, for example, that the police are completely misinformed about the appearance of a dangerous criminal.
The police believe that the criminal is brunette, but he is blonde, the police believe he is bearded, but he is shaved, the police believe that he is tall, but in fact he is short, and so on. If the police drew a wanted poster of this man, then it would resemble someone who is brunette, bearded, tall and so on, and so would not resemble the criminal in the relevant respects. But despite failing to resemble the criminal, the drawing would still succeed in representing him.
2 Correctly resolving the trilemma concerning the depiction of non-existents should resolve this problem too.
Section Two considers Robert Hopkins' proposal to reject the thesis that all depictions resemble what they represent by analysing depiction in terms of experienced rather than genuine resemblance. Section Three considers Nelson
Goodman's proposal to reject the thesis that all depictions resemble what they represent on the grounds that depiction, unlike resemblance, is not unequivocally relational. Section Four considers the possibility of denying the thesis that resemblance is a relation between existents by postulating non-existent objects.
Section Five argues for denying the thesis that some depictions represent non-existent 4 objects by arguing that depiction is a relation between states of affairs. Section Six concludes.
II
It is possible to resolve the trilemma of depicting non-existents by denying the first thesis, that all depictions resemble what they represent, without denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. To see how this is possible, recall that resemblance is obviously insufficient for depiction. Everything resembles itself, for example, but not everything is a depiction of itself. To provide for sufficiency, analyses of depiction usually combine resemblance with various intentional attitudes such as beliefs, intentions or experiences. Given that resemblance is not a sufficient condition for depiction, it's not implausible to suggest that in the final analysis resemblance won't be a necessary condition for depiction either.
Robert Hopkins (1994; 1998) has proposed to exploit this gap in order to deny the first thesis of the trilemma without having to deny the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. According to Hopkins' (1998) relations cannot obtain towards non-existents. My seeing an apple, for example, seems to be a relation between me and the apple, but my hallucinating an apple cannot be such a relation, since in the case of hallucination there is no real apple for me to be related to. By trading the problem of depicting non-existents for the problem of hallucination, Hopkins' proposal merely shifts the bump in the rug.
The force of this objection may be brought out by considering the mirror image of depictions resemble what they represent is to deny the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance on the grounds that depiction -unlike resemblance -is not unequivocally relational. This strategy for resolving the problem is adopted by Nelson Goodman in Languages of Art. He writes "What tends to mislead us is that such locutions as 'picture of' and 'represents' have the appearance of mannerly two-place predicates and can sometimes be so interpreted. But 'picture of Pickwick' and 'represents a unicorn' are better considered unbreakable one-place predicates …" (1968, . So the Mona Lisa, according to Goodman, depicts Lisa in a relational sense, whereas Santa's portrait depicts Santa merely through falling under the unbreakable one-place predicate 'being a Santa-depiction'.
As well as the depiction of non-existents, Goodman's proposal appears able to resolve the problems of the depiction of non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation. The depiction of non-particulars, according to Goodman, is depiction in the non-relational sense. It is supposed to be possible to depict a horse, for example, without depicting any horse in particular, because being a depiction of a horse is not construed by
Goodman as bearing a relation to a particular horse such as Phar Lap, Bucephalus or
Incitatus, but merely as falling under the unbreakable one-place predicate 'being a horse-depiction'. In general, depicting something without depicting anything in particular is supposed to be possible because being a depiction of something is not always bearing a relation to some thing, but merely falling under a one-place predicate.
Similarly, Goodman's proposal appears able to resolve the problem of depictive misrepresentation. Depictive misrepresentation, according to Goodman, involves a division between what is depicted in the relational and non-relational senses. A wanted poster produced by misinformed police, for example, may misrepresent a blonde clean-shaven criminal as bearded and brunette, because it is a depiction of a blonde clean-shaven criminal in the relational sense but also falls under the predicate 'being a bearded-brunette-criminal depiction'. So Goodman appears to be able to avoid the problem of depictive misrepresentation by construing pictorial reference as depiction in the relational sense and pictorial predication as depiction in the nonrelational sense.
As well as appearing to resolve these problems, Goodman's proposal is an improvement on Hopkins', because it does not merely shift the bump in the carpet, but instead appears to form part of a solution to the general problem of intentionality.
In the case of experience, for example, Goodman may argue that 'experience' is ambiguous between a relational and a non-relational sense. When I see the real apple, Goodman would say I have an experience in the relational sense, whereas when I hallucinate an apple, Goodman would say my experience is of an apple merely because it falls under the unbreakable non-relational predicate 'being an apple-seeing'.
Thus, Goodman appears to be able to solve the problem of hallucination by denying that hallucination is relational. But although Goodman appears to offer a compelling motivation for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance, the proposal with which he replaces it is highly unsatisfactory. While it is obvious that certain pictures and representations fall under certain predicates, it seems that the reason pictures and representations fall under these predicates is because of the things they represent.
Pegasus' portrait and 'Pegasus', for example, both fall under the predicate 'being a Pegasus-representation', but the explanation of this ought to be that there is something which both Pegasus' portrait and Pegasus represent. Without further explanation, Goodman's observation that different predicates apply to different representations is totally unilluminating.
IV Just as it's possible to depict unicorns, although no unicorns exist, it's intuitively possible to resemble a unicorn, although no unicorns exist. And just as it's possible to depict a horse without depicting any horse in particular, it's intuitively possible to resemble a horse without resembling any horse in particular. This suggests that exactly the same reasons for denying that depiction is unequivocally relational may be brought forward for denying that resemblance is unequivocally relational. So the same motivation that Goodman gives for denying the thesis that all depictions resemble what they represent may be more naturally brought forward in order to 9 instead deny the thesis that resemblance is a relation between existents.
3
The cost of this solution is that it is committed to denying not only the thesis that resemblance is a relation between existents but also the analysis of resemblance as the relation of sharing properties. Even though it is intuitively possible to resemble a horse without resembling any particular horse, it is impossible to share properties without sharing properties with at least one particular horse, since non-particular hoses do not have properties. Similarly, even though it is intuitively possible to resemble Santa, it is not possible to share properties with Santa, since Santa does not have properties. Sharing properties is a relation, so if resemblance is sharing properties, then resemblance is also a relation. One cannot deny that resemblance is a relation without denying that resemblance is the relation of sharing properties.
But there is another way to deny the thesis that resemblance is a relation between existents, which does not incur the cost of denying that resemblance is sharing properties. Instead of denying that resemblance is a relation, it is possible to deny that resemblance is between existents. In order to do this it is necessary to posit that there are objects which don't exist, called Meinongian objects, and that depictions can be related to these objects. According to this proposal, Santa, although he does not exist, is a non-existent object who is capable of being resembled by Santa's portrait. In general, depictions that don't depict existents are still supposed by this proposal to bear the relations of resemblance and depiction to non-existent objects.
Postulating Meinongian objects -like Goodman's proposal but unlike analysing depiction in terms of other intentional notions -has the advantage that it provides a general solution to the problem of intentionality. In the case of experience, for example, hallucinatory experiences can be construed as relations towards non-existent objects. If, for example, I hallucinate an apple, then the relation that usually obtains between me and the existent apples I normally perceive instead obtains between me and the non-existent apple which I hallucinate. In general, intentional states that are 10 not about things which exist can be construed as states that are about Meinongian objects which don't exist.
4
It might be objected that postulating non-existent objects does not genuinely resolve the trilemma, on the grounds that, since non-existent objects do not have properties, it is not possible to share properties with them and thus not possible to resemble them.
For example, it might be argued that since Santa cannot be red without existing, a picture of Santa cannot resemble Santa in respect of being red without Santa existing.
According to this objection, postulating non-existent objects is of no help in resolving the problem of the depiction of non-existents, since it is still impossible to resemble those non-existent objects.
However, it is standardly argued that Meinongian objects do have properties.
Meinong's view holds that sentences such as 'The round square is round' and 'The round square is square' are true, even though no round square exists. In order to do this Meinong claims that the round square is a non-existent object which nevertheless has the properties of being round and being square. Similarly, a proponent of this position can argue that although Santa doesn't exist, he still has properties such as wearing a red coat, having a beard, being jolly and so forth and that although Vulcan does not exist, it still has the properties of being a planet, orbiting the sun and so forth.
The postulation of non-existent objects to solve problems in other areas is already committed to postulating that non-existent objects have properties.
The Meinongian proposal is also able to resolve the problem of the depiction of nonparticulars by postulating that there are non-existent objects which are also indeterminate. Depicting a horse but no particular horse, for example, can be analysed as a relation towards a non-existent object which has the property of being a horse, but lacks the properties of being Phar Lap, being Bucephalus, being Incitatus or being any other particular horse. In general, a depiction of something but not anything in particular can be analysed as a depiction of a non-existent object which has only the properties which the picture represents it as having. This treatment of the depiction of will argue for rejecting the third thesis by construing depiction as a relation between states of affairs.
Depictions represent particulars, properties and states of affairs. The Mona Lisa, for example, represents Lisa herself, the property of smiling and the state of affairs of Lisa's smiling. I will argue for denying the thesis that some depictions represent nonexistents by arguing that the apparent depiction of non-existent particulars is really the depiction of existent states of affairs. I will also argue for denying the first thesis as applied to particulars: not all depictions resemble the particulars they represent. But, I will argue, the first thesis is true as applied to states of affairs: all depictive states of affairs resemble the states of affairs they represent. Thus, the apparent depiction of non-existents is compatible with the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.
A natural way to deny the thesis that some depictions represent non-existents is to deny that apparent depictions of non-existents depict particulars at all. It may be argued that Santa's portrait, for example, does not really depict any particular, on the grounds that Santa, the particular which Santa's portrait is purported to depict, does not exist. The same can be said of pictures of Pegasus and diagrams of Phlogiston:
since the particulars these pictures are purported to represent do not in fact exist, it is reasonable to argue that portraits of Pegasus and diagrams of Phlogiston do not in fact depict particulars. Since, in general, non-existent particulars do not exist, it seems that the apparent depiction of non-existents cannot be the depiction of particulars. No difficulty for the depiction of states of affairs is posed by inexistence because, unlike particulars which may simply exist or not, states of affairs may fail to obtain without ceasing to exist. Just as there is a fact of the Eiffel Tower's being in Paris, for example, there is a state of affairs of the Eiffel Tower's being in New York, although that state of affairs does not obtain. So since all states of affairs are existents, construing depiction as primarily a relation between states of affairs -including states of affairs which do not obtain -provides a way to deny the thesis that some depictions represent non-existents, while still accommodating the intentionality of depictive representation and thus resolving the trilemma.
14 As well as the depiction of non-existents, analysing depiction as a relation between states of affairs resolves the problem of depicting non-particulars. The state of affairs which obtains if there is a tall man, for example, is distinct from the state of affairs of some particular man's being tall. So if depiction is a relation between states of affairs, then depicting a man without depicting any man in particular can be construed as a relation towards the state of affairs, for example, of a man's being tall, but not to a state of affairs of any particular man's being tall. In general, a depiction that doesn't depict something in particular can be analysed as a depiction of a state of affairs of something's, but not any particular thing's, having a property.
Similarly, depictive misrepresentation can be analysed as the depiction of a state of affairs which does not obtain. Although the police's picture, for example, does not resemble the criminal as he is, the state of affairs of the police's picture's having a certain colour resembles the state of affairs of the criminal's having the colour which the police believe him to have, since they are both states of affairs of something's having that colour. In general, depictions are accurate when the states of affairs they are of obtain, and inaccurate when the states of affairs they are of fail to obtain. So The reason is that in the case of Meinongian objects there is a prima facie equivalence between objects that there are and objects that exist. In the case of states of affairs, however, there is no prima facie equivalence between states of affairs existing and obtaining. So there is some reason to expect that the distinction between existent and non-existent objects cannot be drawn, whereas a distinction between obtaining and non-obtaining states of affairs can be.
10
VI I have considered four proposals for resolving the problems of depictive intentionality:
analysing depiction in terms of experience, denying that depiction is a relation, postulating non-existent objects and analysing depiction as a relation between states of affairs. I believe that the final proposal -analysing depiction as a relation between states of affairs -provides a solution to the problem which is compatible with the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance and which also forms part of the most plausible solution to the problem of intentionality in general. But the other proposals also have their advantages. Even so, it seems likely that even if one of the other solutions to the problem of intentionality turns out to be more plausible, that solution will also be compatible with the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.
The most striking moral of this discussion is not the merits of any particular proposal, but the similarity in the shape of the issues with other areas in which the problem of intentionality arises: the various options for resolving the problem of the depiction of 10 The appropriateness of sentences such as 'there are horses which do not exist' may be taken to demonstrate a prima facie distinction between what there is and what exists. However, it may be argued that 'there are horses which do not exist' is a loose way of saying that there are possible horses which do not actually exist, just as 'there is no beer' is a loose way of saying that there is no beer in the fridge.
non-existents, for example, are the same as the various options which are available for resolving the problem of intentional inexistence in general. The distinctive role of resemblance in depictive representation adds some extra subtleties to the dialectic, but on closer examination the same problems can usually be raised for other kinds of representation. I conclude that the intentionality of depictive representation poses no specific difficulties either for the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance or those theories of depictive representation which are built upon it.
I want to conclude by emphasising that however the general problem of intentionality should be resolved -whether it be by postulating Meinongian objects, denying that representation is relational, analysing representation in terms of experience or, as I have suggested, by analysing representation as a relation towards states of affairsthe problem in the specific case of depiction should not be resolved by denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. The reason is that because the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance is the only element of the problem which is specific to depictive representation, denying that platitude is the option which is least able to provide a solution to the problem of intentionality in general.
